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The Politics ofLegality
Yash Ghai
On 19 May 1987, five days after Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka's
coup against the Labour-National Federation Party Coalition govern-
ment, Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau assumed direct power
himself and announced his intention to administer Fiji through a council
of advisers he would appoint. 1 On the same day, he dissolved Parliament
and dismissed the prime minister, Dr Timoci Bavadra, and his ministerial
colleagues. At the end of August 1987, he was still claiming to be the sole
executive authority in Fiji. The claims of the governor-general to be in sole
charge and authority were given credence abroad, especially at Buck-
ingham Palace and Downing Street, and by sections of the local commu-
nity-until almost the time of his resignation in October 1987. These
claims served a number of purposes, which were not lost on Rabuka and
promoted his aims. 2 The cloak of the rule of the governor-general pro-
tected the regime from the full force of foreign as well as domestiC opposi-
tion; cut off the Coalition leaders from access to the Queen and certain
foreign governments; enabled foreign governments sympathetic to the
coup (like the British) to justify their continued support of it; put the entire
administration at the service of new objectives; protected Rabuka and his
collaborators from the due process of law; restored to power the instru-
ments of indigenous Fijian hegemony; and enabled the governor-general
and Rabuka to maintain their traditional relationship of turaga and bati
(chief and warrior).
There is little doubt that the apparent legality of the regime damaged
the position of the deposed government (although it might not have
regarded it as entirely unfortunate that the governor-general stayed in
place). In particular it was their view that the dissolution of Parliament
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 2, Number I, Spring I990, II-35
© I990 by University ofHawaii Press
II
I2 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING I990
and the dismissal of the government went beyond the powers of the gover-
nor-general. Denied effective access to the Queen to challenge the actions
of the governor-general, and finding itself left out of new institutions of
administration, the deposed government challenged the legality of the dis-
solution and the dismissal in court. On 29 May I987 it filed a case request-
ing the Supreme Court to declare, among other things, that the dissolution
of Parliament and the dismissal of the prime minister and the cabinet were
beyond the power of the governor-general. The governor-general tried to
have the case struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. On I4
August I987 Mr Justice Rooney decided that the action was not frivolous,
but was "probably the most significant and important action ever brought
before any court in Fiji," and ruled that it should proceed to a full hearing
(Bavadra v A-G I987). However, the case was never adjudicated upon,
for, after the conclusion of the Deuba Accord in September I987 providing
for the formation of a caretaker government composed of the Coalition
and Alliance parties, the Coalition withdrew it as a gesture of conciliation.
It is not idle to speculate what the decision of the court would have been
had it heard the case. Many countries in the Pacific have formal and cere-
monial heads of state, and their relationship with the executive or the leg-
islature can become problematic unless there is a clear understanding of
the limits of their respective powers. When the constitutionality of the acts
of someone like the governor-general in this instance is challenged, at least
three lines of defense are possible. The first is that the acts are squarely
within the powers of the governor-general as provided in the constitution.
The second is that the acts are justified by necessity in the exceptional and
difficult circumstances, not contemplated by the constitution, that have
arisen (the doctrine of necessity). The third is that the acts have funda-
mentally altered the basis of the constitutional and legal system, in fact
repudiated the old order, and established a new, effective system validat-
ing the acts (the doctrine of the successful coup). It is clear in the Fiji case
that the governor-general would not have relied on the third defense
(whereas if Rabuka had been a defendant, he might well have relied on it,
although even he did not abrogate the I970 constitution until October
I987). The governor-general continued to profess his loyalty to the Queen
and the constitution and to claim that his powers arose from the constitu-
tion. But it is also possible that his legal advisers may have raised the
defense of necessity, and there are indications that at times his lawyers
thought that was a stronger basis for his authority.
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This paper will therefore concentrate on the two defenses of constitu-
tional validity and necessity; but first it is necessary to set out the sequence
of events in Fiji during the critical period in I987.
THE FIJI COUPS: A CHRONOLOGY
For the general elections of April I987 the National Federation Party and
the Labour Party formed a coalition with a common manifesto and a com-
mon slate of candidates. It won 28 seats, against 24 for the Alliance Party,
and thus ended the uninterrupted rule of the Alliance Party since Fiji's
independence in I970. Dr Timoci Bavadra, the president of the Labour
Party and the leader of the Coalition, was appointed prime minister by the
governor-general under section 73(2) of the constitution on I4 April, and
the prime minister designated a number of ministers under section 7S(I);
the sensitive portfolios of land, education, and home and Fijian affairs
were given to Fijians.
A month later Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka staged his coup. He
announced the suspension of the constitution, plans for an interim council
of ministers, and his intention to return Fiji to democratic government
under a revised constitution. At first Rabuka said that he had acted to bar
Indians permanently from ever winning control of the government again
(IB, June I987, 8). Later the same day he said that the coup was to prevent
any further disturbance and bloodshed and called it a "pre-emptive" mea-
sure to avoid Fijian violence against Bavadra's Indian-dominated govern-
ment. In his authorized biography, Rabuka: No Other Way (Dean and
Ritova I988), he made it clear that his primary motive was to ensure the
political paramountcy of the indigenous Fijians.
Rabuka sought the recognition of the governor-general for his regime
(it is not clear under what legal provision or principle, since his suspension
of the constitution would have deprived the governor-general of his own
office, and in any case he had no constitutional power to appoint a
usurper to office), but appears to have failed. Instead, the governor-gen-
eral issued a statement (whose rebroadcast was prevented by the armed
forces) in which he condemned the takeover, declared a state of public
emergency, and said that he was taking immediate steps to restore the law-
ful situation. He emphasized that the constitution was the supreme law of
Fiji; it had not been overridden, and all duly appointed public officers
remained in office. As commander in chief, he called on the armed forces,
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the police, and the public service to return to their lawful allegiances in
accordance with the oath of office and their duty of obedience without
delay. He commanded the people of Fiji to respect and obey the constitu-
tion. After the statement, the governor-general contacted Buckingham
Palace and received a message of encouragement from the Queen.
Rabuka apparently ignored the orders of the governor-general and
announced his council of ministers the following day, when it also had its
first meeting. This council was dominated by former Alliance ministers
(including their previous prime minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara), and all
but two members were Fijians; Rabuka himself was president and minis-
ter of home affairs. Both the governor-general and Rabuka claimed to be
in full control, but the armed forces stopped radio stations from broad-
casting the former's statements and introduced press censorship. The chief
justice was told that the constitution would be abrogated, the regime
would govern by decree, and after an interval a constitutional conference
would be convened. The judges' appointments would also lapse, but they
would be reappointed on I8 May under a new oath of allegiance. Later the
same day Rabuka, accompanied by a legal adviser, went to see the gover-
nor-general to persuade him to accept his authority, while the governor-
general reportedly urged him to call off his coup. Meanwhile Rabuka and
his council strengthened their grip over the administration. On I7 May
(Sunday) the governor-general swore in Rabuka as head of the govern-
ment in a secret ceremony, and agreed to swear in the rest of the council
later in the week.
On the previous day Supreme Court judges and the chief magistrate had
met with the chief justice, when they agreed to continue as normal and to
refuse any directives from the military regime. The constitution remained
in effect, they argued, and they assured the governor-general of "our com-
plete and undivided loyalty and our readiness to continue to exercise our
duties in accordance with the law of Fiji and our oaths of office" (in a let-
ter dated I7 May 1987 and reproduced in Tinker et al I987). On Sunday
the governor-general heeded the advice against recognizing Rahuka's
regime or abrogating the constitution, and on the twentieth he issued a
statement to the effect that he had decided it would be impossible for him
to recognize the military regime. He went on to state that the regime had
recognized his right to exercise executive authority and had urged him to
stay on as governor-general. A rebuttal from the ministry of information,
however, revealed that Rabuka had already been sworn in as head of the
GHAI • A COUP BY ANOTHER NAME?
government and his council was scheduled to be sworn in on the following
day. The next morning the governor-general refused to swear in Rabuka
and his council.
A special meeting of the Great Council of Chiefs (convened without
proper authorization) opened in Suva to discuss the current situation and
future constitutional changes. Later in the day the governor-general issued
an important statement in which he sought to establish the legal basis of
his authority and administration. It said that he had explained to Rabuka
that it was constitutionally impossible for him to swear in the council of
ministers because of the illegality of the military government. Acting in
accordance with the principles of the constitution, he would dissolve Par-
liament and prepare the stage for fresh general elections. He would con-
tinue to exercise executive authority under the constitution and appoint a
council to advise him. The council of advisers would inquire into the effi-
cacy and general acceptance of the 1970 constitution and suggest modifi-
cations to meet the expectations and assuage the fears of the people of Fiji.
The governor-general said that he had taken this step because he was con-
vinced that he was unable to restore the present Parliament and that it was
his responsibility to take into account the "practical realities of the situa-
tion and the social structure of Fiji." At the same time he proposed to exer-
cise the prerogative of mercy in favor of Rabuka and others "implicated in
the illegal seizure of power" because "no useful purpose would be served
by vindictiveness which might hinder the complete restoration of legiti-
macy" (Radio Fiji, 7 June 1987).3
A proclamation by the governor-general was published the same day in
the Fiji Royal Gazette in which he dissolved Parliament and declared the
offices of the prime minister, the attorney general, all ministers, and the
leader of the opposition vacant (Proclamation NO.3 [19 May 1987], in
FRG vol II4, no. 38). Dr Bavadra and his ministers were released the same
evening after their legal adviser had filed an application for habeas corpus;
although he declared that those involved in the coup were guilty of trea-
son, he promised to cooperate with the governor-general. The next morn-
ing he called on the governor-general to express support for his scheme. It
appears, however, that the Great Council of Chiefs, sympathetic to the
coup, was not pleased with the governor-general's plan and advocated a
republic as a way out of Fiji's constitutional difficulties. The governor-
general attended the meeting of the council to explain his proposals and
agreed to defer appointment to his council of advisers until after the delib-
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erations of the chiefs. On 22 May the governor-general announced the for-
mation of a I9-member council of advisers; under Rabuka, 8 of them
would review the constitution, and the remainder would be responsible
for routine administration. Alliance and Fijian members dominated; there
were to be only 2 Coalition members (see Lal I988). Ratu Mara became
adviser for foreign affairs, while Rabuka retained responsibility for home
affairs and the armed forces. Bavadra and his deputy, Harish Sharma, (the
leader of the National Federation Party) declined the invitation to join the
council, complaining about the lack of consultation and the small repre-
sentation given to the Coalition.
The Coalition members challenged the legality of the dissolution of Par-
liament "in that it was not done on the advice of the Prime Minister as
required by the Constitution. The Governor-General's emergency powers
do not allow him to dissolve Parliament. The purported agreement
between the Governor-General and those who seized power unlawfully is
without any legal or moral foundation" (IB, June I987, I3). They urged
the governor-general to "immediately restore the democratically elected
government." On 29 May Bavadra filed a summons in the Supreme Court
seeking a declaration that the dissolution of Parliament was illegal and
that he remained prime minister. Two days previously the New Zealand
judges of the Fiji Court of Appeal wrote to the governor-general saying
that unless changes to the constitution were made by Parliament in
accordance with prescribed procedures, they would resign from the court;
he replied that whatever changes were made would be within the law
(Radio Fiji, I9 May I987).
Frustrated by their inability to make an impression on the governor-
general, the Coalition sent a delegation, led by Bavadra, to London to see
the Queen as Fiji's head of state. The Queen, apparently after consulta-
tions with the governor-general, refused to see Bavadra, but he did meet
twice with her private secretary, Sir William Heseltine. Little is known
about what transpired at these meetings. Back in Fiji, the governor-gen-
eral claimed on 7 June that there would be no change to the constitution in
an illegal manner, but that the review would look at strengthening the
political rights of indigenous Fijians. He assured the public that provisions
dealing with fundamental rights, citizenship, public service, and the judi-
ciary would be altered. ,
On 9 June the governor-general enacted the Public Emergency (Mainte-
nance of Supplies and Se~vice) Regulations, which gave him and certain
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officials wide-ranging powers to secure essential services and reversed the
presumption of innocence in relation to offenses under the act. On II June
he made another announcement that he intended to preserve the frame-
work of legality and outlined his scheme for the restoration of constitu-
tional rule. He prop?sed to appoint a Constitutional Review Committee;
its proposals would be submitted to a Council of National Reconciliation
that he would convene to reach a consensus on the changes to the consti-
tution. Once that consensus was achieved, uncontested elections to Parlia-
ment would be held, and Parliament would enact the changes. Parliament
would then be dissolved, and fresh elections, based on the amended con-
stitution, would follow. It was understood that the governor-general
wanted the writs for the first, uncontested elections to be issued within
sixty days of the time when he dissolved Parliament (shortly after the mid-
dle of July) to conform to section 69(3) of the constitution. On 23 June he
provided further details of the composition (with a bias toward Fijian and
chiefly interests) and terms of reference (emphasizing rights of indigenous
Fijians) of the Constitutional Review Committee. Bavadra returned to Fiji
on 24 June and met the governor-general on the twenty-sixth, when he
told him that the committee should reflect the equitable representation of
all races as provided in the I970 constitution, and that the constitution
should treat all races fairly.
On 3 July the governor-general announced the composition and terms
of the Constitutional Review Committee. It was to be chaired by Sir John
Falvey, former Alliance attorney general, and composed of four nominees
each of the governor-general (supposed to be politically neutral), the
Great Council of Chiefs (including Rabuka), the leader of the Coalition,
and the leader of the Alliance. It was to propose amendments that "will
guarantee indigenous Fijian interests with full regard to the interests of
other people in Fiji." After receiving and reviewing eight hundred submis-
sions from groups and individuals, it submitted its report on I7 August
(FCRC I987). However, it was unable to reach a consensus and produced
both a majority and a minority report. The majority, consisting of the
nominees of the Alliance Party and the Great Council of Chiefs and
the two Fijians nominated by the governor-general, advocated several
changes to increase Fijian representation in the legislature and to reserve
various offices of state for Fijians. The minority report recommended the
retention of the I970 constitution in its entirety.
Far from reaching agreement, the Constitutional Review Committee
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had further polarized opinion, and it became obvious that the following
stages of the governor-general's scheme had become unworkable. Eco-
nomic difficulties were worsening, and ethnic and political tensions
remained high. The governor-general convened a meeting of the Alliance
and the Coalition under his own chairmanship to see if a basis for consen-
sus within the National Reconciliation Council could be established in
advance. A series of meetings were held at Deuba from 4 to 22 September,
when a different agreement on the formation of a caretaker government
(the Deuba Accord) was reached and signed. The caretaker government
would consist of an equal number of members from the Alliance and the
Coalition under the chairmanship of the governor-general, and its pri-
mary task would be to guide the country to a solution of its constitutional
problems as well as to help with the recovery of the economy and the res-
toration of law and order. A subcommittee of the new council, chaired by
an eminent judge from another Commonwealth country, would have the
responsibility to make proposals for the constitution. Two days later the
group was to meet to agree on the division of portfolios and to approve
r, the governor-general's proclamation giving effect to the agreement.
Before that could be done, Rabuka led another military coup. Leaders
of the Coalition were detained. However, the governor-general arranged a
meeting between Rabuka and the leaders of the two parties for the follow-
ing Monday. At that meeting Rabuka outlined his terms for a new admin-
istration, which were similar to the proposals of the Great Council of
Chiefs. While the Alliance was agreeable to Rabuka's offer, the Coalition
was not. Rabuka then appeared to conclude that the only way he could
achieve his objectives was through a republic~
He asked the governor-general to assume the presidency of the planned
republic; Ganilau refused and claimed still to be the lawful authority. On I
October Rabuka declared himself the head and commander of an Interim
Military Government, revoked the constitution, and assumed to himself
the power to legislate by decree. On 7 October he declared Fiji a republic
and on 9 October he appointed a 21-member Executive Council, drawn
largely from the Alliance and including Mara as foreign minister. On 15
October the chief justice and other judges refused to serve the new regime
and were dismissed. Later the same day the governor-general tendered his
resignation to the Queen, while she was in Vancouver for the meeting of
Commonwealth leaders. Fiji's membership in the Commonwealth was ter-
minated by the meeting. The governor-general remained in the State
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House and was eventually persuaded to become president (although he
had earlier said that he would not become president without a constitu-
tion that was fair to the multiracial population as a whole) in an agree-
ment that saw the appointment of Mara as prime minister with his cabinet
(replacing the short-lived Executive Council), which included Rabuka and
three other officers. The former chief justice, Sir Timoci Tuivaga, also
agreed to return to his post. The ambiguities that had surrounded the con-
stitutional system of Fiji since the first coup in May were eventually
resolved; but the mixture of military and civilian administration re-
mained, and the three key posts of the state were in the hands of the same
persons as before the military adventures began.
THE LEGALITY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ACTIONS
The question of the legality of the actions of the governor-general is not
easy to determine. Although he vacillated a great deal, it is clear that his
actions have to be examined with reference to the terms of the 1970 consti-
tution and to the doctrine of necessity. The question of his powers deriv-
ing from a coup does not arise, for then his position as governor-general
would come to an end, and any powers he might have would depend on
the status accorded him by Rabuka under a new constitutional dispensa-
tion, as happened after the second coup. The governor-general always
claimed that he was acting under the 1970 constitution, at first within its
provisions and conventions, and later under the doctrine of necessity with
that constitution still providing the broad framework. It is therefore nec-
essary to examine his actions under both the express provisions of the con-
stitution and any doctrine of necessity implicit in it or more general consti-
tutional principles.
Validity under the Constitution
The first formal action of the governor-general was to proclaim an emer-
gency and assume the powers of administration under it. It has already
been suggested that he fought off Rabuka's attempt to abrogate the consti-
tution and to rule by his own decrees. In that sense Ratu Ganilau's
assumption of emergency powers might be seen, and at the time was
widely seen, as maintaining the rule of the constitution. The governor-
general himself justified the proclamation of emergency under section
18(6)(b) of the constitution. But the powers of the governor-general under
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this section are to be exercised in accordance with the advice of the cabinet
(section 78). He also claimed, as we have seen, that the executive author-
ity of Fiji was vested in the Queen and exercised by him on her behalf on
the advice of the cabinet. In the temporary absence of her ministers, he
assumed that authority to himself. The constitution does not give him the
power to act independently under either section 18(6)(b) or section 72 in
any circumstances. Nor is it possible to rely on any conventions for the
authority, when the legal provisions are clear. It would be equally inap-
propriate to invoke prerogative powers, since the basis of public power is
the written constitution. Although it was not so claimed by the governor-
general at the time, if there is authority for the assumption of direct
authority and the declaration of emergency, it may lie in the doctrine of
necessity, which is examined later.
Having declared an emergency and assumed governmental powers to
himself, the governor-general proceeded to make various regulations.
Under what authority could he make regulations? In the preamble to the
most important of these, the Public Emergency Regulations of 18 May
1987, he recited that section 72 vested executive authority in the Queen,
which authority may be exercised directly by him or through officers sub-
ordinate to him. Since he does not cite any other authority for the promul-
gation of the regulations, it must be surmised that he thought that section
72 gave him the authority.4 The constitution does not give the executive
any authority to make regulations during an emergency (as in for example
Western Samoa, Nauru, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Kiribati).
It is presumably open to Parliament to delegate such law-making powers
to the executive, but this appears not to have been done in Fiji. The gover-
nor-general's powers to make emergency regulations did not therefore
arise from the constitution or an act of Parliament.
Assuming that he did have the powers, were they valid under the consti-
tution? The regulations gave the police and the armed forces the absolute
right to ban or disperse meetings and processions, close roads, impose
curfews, detain (pending enquiries) persons suspected of actions prejudi-
cial to public safety, control the movement of persons, and designate
places or areas as "protected," thereby prohibiting the entry into or pres-
ence in them of members of the public. The regulations enabled the gover-
nor-general to control the movement of persons, the possession of fire-
arms, and the manufacture or display of flags and uniforms. The police
and the armed forces were given extensive powers to arrest any person
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suspected of having committed or being about to commit a breach of the
regulations. The courts were authorized to hold trials arising out of
alleged breaches in camera "if it is expedient in the interests of justice or of
public safety or security so to do."
Although these regulations restrict many of the fundamental rights pro-
tected under the constitution, the constitution provides for derogations in
the interest of public safety, and it could be argued that the regulations
would be justified under those provisions. However, only such deroga-
tions are permitted as are necessary to deal with the exceptional circum-
stances that may have arisen, and which are "reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society." Applying these criteria, it is doubtful if the regula-
tions were valid. The threat to public safety came from the more militant
members of the Taukei Movement or certain members of the armed
forces. The latter ,were largely excluded from the regulations (and in fact
were vested with the responsibility for their enforcement), while the for-
mer would appear not to be the targets of the regulations in the contem-
plation of the governor-general. The regulations were used primarily
against the members and supporters of the deposed government.
There are similar doubts about some of the other major decisions and
acts of the governor-general. Two of these, the dissolution of the Parlia-
ment and the dismissal of the prime minister and his ministers, were chal-
lenged by Dr Bavadra in the Supreme Court, but the action was with-
drawn before the full hearing after the Deuba agreement. In neither case
was the prime minister consulted by the governor-general, who was cer-
tainly not acting on cabinet advice.
The powers of the governor-general to dissolve Parliament may be
briefly summarized. The general rule is that he can dissolve Parliament
only on the advice of the prime minister (section 70). However, he may
dissolve Parliament in his own deliberate judgment in two situations: (a) if
the House of Representatives has passed a vote of no confidence in the
prime minister, and within three days he either does or does not resign or
advise the dissolution of the House; (b) when the office of the prime minis-
ter is vacant, and the governor-general does not consider that there is any
prospect of his being able to appoint a person to that office who can com-
mand the support of the majority of the members of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Neither of these exceptional circumstances applied in this case,
and one must therefore conclude that insofar as the constitution was con-
cerned, the act of the governor-general in dissolving Parliament was ille-
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gal. The power of the governor-general to dismiss the government is set
out in section 74. During the lifetime of a Parliament, the governor-gen-
eral can dismiss the prime minister only if the House of Representatives
has passed a vote of no confidence in him. He cannot dismiss any other
minister except on the advice of the prime minister. Here again there is no
doubt that his dismissal of the government was illegal, so far as the consti-
tution is concerned.
The constitution may not be dispositive of the question of the legality of
the governor-general's actions. At first he appears to have taken the posi-
tion that his powers came from the constitution, that the imprisonment of
his ministers enabled him to exer~isepowers in his own discretion, and the
emergency powers were thus justified. (His early proclamations were
based on that view, for example, Proclamation NO.3 of I9 May, and even
in his broadcast to the nation of 7 June he said that "I have taken on the
role of executive authority for managing the affairs of the nation in line
with the powers vested in the office of the Governor-General by the Con-
stitution.") But as he was drawn into further acts more and more remote
from the constitution, he seems to have taken the line that the authority
for his actions was the doctrine of necessity. For example, in his proclama-
tion of 22 May I987 giving amnesty to Rabuka and his collaborators, he
based his powers on both his constitutional status as governor-general and
"by virtue of extra-legal powers necessitated and compelled upon me by
the worst political crisis ever experienced in the history of Fiji." His legal
advisers would undoubtedly have relied on the doctrine of necessity if the
case against him by Bavadra had proceeded to argument. It would be diffi-
cult to argue that he was relying on his residual powers under the constitu-
tion, for the constitution sought to provide for a complete scheme for the
exercise and control of public power, and the conventions governing the
powers of the head of state were reduced to specific legal provisions in the
constitution, leaving no room for unspecified, but constitutional, powers.
(For further elaboration of this point, see Ghai and Cottrell n.d.)
The Doctrine ofNecessity
The acts of the military under Rabuka that threw the country into turmoil
were outside the contemplation of the constitution. The doctrine of neces-
sity is perhaps a more secure basis for the acts of the governor-general.
Before looking at the relevance of this doctrine in the situation specific to
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Fiji, one should understand how it has been developed by courts else-
where.
The essence of the doctrine is that if an action that is illegal was taken
to safeguard the security of the state or the welfare of its citizens when no
lawful course was possible, the necessity of the case excuses the illegality.
Although the doctrine is said to be ancient (Williams 1953; Judge Haynes
in the Grenadan case of Mitchell v DPP [1986]), its application to modern
constitutional law is frequently traced to the well-known Pakistan case,
Reference by H E the Governor-General NO.1 of 1955. The governor-gen-
eral had dissolved the Constituent Assembly, which was established to
adopt a constitution for Pakistan but which also had ordinary legislative
power. The assent of the governor-general had been dispensed with in
relation to all bills passed by the assembly in the mistaken belief that such
assent was unnecessary. When the speaker of the assembly challenged the
legality of the dissolution, the Supreme Court held that the courts had no
jurisdiction to hear the case since the legislation giving jurisdiction to the
courts was void due to the absence of the assent of the governor-general
(Federation ofPakistan v Tamizuddin). While this took the new regime off
the hook, the victory cup was a poisoned chalice since it rendered void all
the legislation passed by the assembly over an eight-year period.
The governor-general sought to fill the void by issuing a proclamation
under the basic constitutional act still in force giving his assent retrospec-
tively to all the legislation. In Usif Patel v Crown (1955) the court held that
he had no such power, since the proclamation itself amounted to legisla-
tion. The governor-general immediately summoned a Constitutional Con-
vention to make a provision for a constitution and meanwhile issued a
proclamation assuming to himself (until the convention provided other-
wise) such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce laws that
were needed to avoid a constitutional and administrative breakdown. In
reliance on these powers, he retrospectively validated a number of earlier
acts, but referred the question of the legality of his actions (including the
dissolution of the assembly and attempts to validate its legislation) to the
Supreme Court. The court gave its opinion on the basis of "facts" as
alleged in the reference, which included a recital that the constitutional
machinery had broken down; a state of emergency had been declared
throughout the country; and the Constituent Assembly, having lost the
confidence of the people, could no longer function. The court held, by a
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majority of three to two, that although under the constitution the gover-
nor-general did not have the power to do what he had done, his actions
were valid under the doctrine of necessity. Referring to a number of
ancient English authorities, the court held that in exceptional circum-
stances, illegal acts are justified if they are necessary to preserve public
order or the security of the state. It relied on the maxims salus populi
suprema lex est (the safety of the people is the supreme law) and salus
reipublicae est suprema lex (the safety of the state is the supreme law).
Some of the authorities had held even private persons justified in their ille-
gal acts on these grounds; the Pakistani court took the view that "in the
case of the Head of State justification to act [in necessity] must a fortiori
be clearer and more imperative" (ChiefJustice Muhammad Munir).
The court held that in view of the irresponsible behavior of the Constit-
uent Assembly, the governor-general was justified in dissolving it, and
having dissolved it, was justified in enacting legislation himself pending
validation by the new Constitutional Convention. It said that the gover-
nor-general "must be held to have acted in order to avert impending disas-
ter and to prevent the State and society from dissolution." However, it
went on to say that since the validity of those laws during the interim
period was founded on necessity, there should be no delay in calling the
Constituent Assembly. The dissenting judges maintained that the law of
necessity was confined to cases where in times of war or other national
disaster the executive might interfere with private rights, but that it had
never been extended to changes in constitutional law, and most authori-
ties referred to had related to periods of supreme and undisputed royal
power. One of them (Mr Justice Cornelius) said that "the records of these
affairs are hardly the kind of scripture which one would expect to be
quoted in a proceeding which is essentially one in the enforcement and
maintenance of representative institutions. For they can bring but cold
comfort to any protagonist of the autocratic principle against the now uni-
versal rule that the will of the people is sovereign."
In spite of Mr Justice Cornelius' powerful dissent, the views of the
majority of the court have been followed in other jurisdictions. But the
other courts that have followed the doctrine have been more careful in
elaborating the limits on the powers that may be exercised under it. The
Supreme Court of Cyprus in a detailed discussion in Attorney-General v
Mustafa Ibrahim (I964) set down these limits. The legislature of Cyprus
sitting without its Turkish members purported to pass a law to amend the
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personnel and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, due to the boycott of
the courts by the Turkish judges. The legislation did not conform to con-
stitutional requirements for its enactment, and indeed sought to alter
some provisions of the law that had been declared unalterable. The gov-
ernment's justification was that the rigidity of the constitution and the
noncooperation of the Turks had rendered the old law unworkable, and a
large number of cases were pending. The considerable tension between
the Greek and Turkish communities was liable to be aggravated by the
breakdown in the judicial system.
Under these circumstances the court was willing to accept the validity
of the legislation (as one judge said "Otherwise the absurd corollary
would have been entailed, viz., that a State and the people should be
allowed to perish for the sake of its constitution"). The court's decision
was clearly influenced by the consideration" outlined by one judge, that
"the legislature has not abolished any organ of the state, or any of its
courts, but it simply legislated for another court to take their place during
the period they will not be functioning ...." Another judge said that the
doctrine would only be applicable where four conditions were satisfied:
there must be an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional cir-
cumstances; no lesser remedy would suffice; the measure taken must be
proportionate to the necessity; and it must be of a temporary character
limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances (Mr justice
josephides at 265).
judges who, in the series of cases arising from the Unilateral Declara-
tion of Independence in Rhodesia, were not prepared to hold the Smith
regime lawful but were prepared to uphold its laws and acts on the basis
of necessity, sought to impose some limitations on the exercise of power.
Mr justice Lewis at first instance held that only such legislative and
administrative powers could be exercised as would be lawful under the
I96I constitution for the preservation of peace and good government and
the maintenance of law and order (Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke
I968). When the case went on appeal to the Privy Council only Lord
Pearce was willing to recognize any of the acts of the Smith regime-on
the basis of necessity-but even he imposed three qualifications on the
exercise of power. Necessity would validate only such laws as were
directed to and reasonably required for the orderly running of the state;
did not impair the rights of the citizens under the previous lawful Consti-
tution; and were not intended to strengthen the usurper ([I969] Appeal
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Cases). The doctrine was also considered in subsequent Pakistani cases.
Iilani v Punjab (1972) arose when President Ayub Khan, faced with
mounting opposition to his regime, purported to hand over power to the
head of the army, Yahya Khan. The latter declared martial law, arguing
that the armed forces could not "remain idle spectators of the state of near
anarchy," and assumed the office of the president. The court refused to
recognize the validity of his regime but was prepared to enforce a few of
his laws, although not all, since they did not satisfy the tests outlined
above. In Bhutto v Chief of Staff (1977), the court upheld Zia ul-Haq's
assumption of power, taking the view that his action was not intended to
completely suppress or destroy the constitutional order, but represented a
temporary deviation in order to restore law and order and to provide for
free and fair elections to return the country to democratic rule. In a Nige-
rian case (Lakanmi v Attorney-General 1971) the court held that a military
takeover of power in 1966 was a temporary expedient to restore law and
order, and that democracy and consequently its acts were to be tested
against the doctrine of necessity and not a coup. It went on to hold that
the legislation in question, for the forfeiture of the property of the plain-
tiff, was invalid as it went "beyond the necessity of the occasion."
The Grenada Court of Appeal, in a case that involved the validity of the
decrees of the government of Bishop following the overthrow of the gov-
ernment of Gairy by his political party, the New Jewel Movement, and
those of the governor-general after the US invasion of Grenada and the
ousting of th~ military regime that had murdered Bishop, reviewed exten-
sively the authorities on necessity, and its decision may be regarded as a
considered and authoritative statement of the doctrine. In upholding the
decrees, the court laid down a number of conditions for the validity of acts
under the doctrine of necessity: an imperative necessity must arise because
of the existence of exceptional circumstances not provided for in the con-
stitution, for immediate action to be taken to protect or preserve some
vital function of the state; there must be no other course of action reasona-
bly available; any such action must be reasonably necessary in the interest
of peace, order, and good government, but it must not do more than is
necessary or legislate beyond that; the action must not impair the just
rights of citizens under the constitution; and it must not have the sole
effect and intention of consolidating or strengthening a revolution as such
(Mitchell v DPP 1986,88-89)'
To return to the Fiji situation, although it is my view that this doctrine
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arises independently of the constitution, its operation is connected with it.
The doctrine of necessity requires that the old constitutional order be
respected as far as possible, with only the minimum deviations from it
necessary for the exigencies of the situation being permitted. In that sense
the constitution does provide the basic framework for law and administra-
tion. My understanding is that the governor-general received conflicting
legal advice on how far the doctrine of necessity enabled him to deviate
from the constitution and existing laws (one view being that he had pretty
well a carte blanche), but there is some evidence that the governor-general
did feel himself bound by the parameters of the constitution. For example,
in his proposals of II June I987 for the return to constitutional democracy
he had provided for the adoption of new constitutional provisions by an
act of Parliament under the I970 constitution and was anxious that gen-
eral elections should be held within sixty days of his dissolution of Parlia-
ment (the period provided in the constitution). He described his proposals
as "the most direct path that I can realistically take within the laws of Fiji."
Moreover, when the negotiations between the Coalition and the Alliance
parties took place under his chairmanship some controversial decisions
(eg, about the composition of the Council of State and his own role as its
chairman) were sought to be resolved by the requirements of the doctrine
that the constitution should as far as possible provide the framework.
The Acts 0/ the Governor-General and the Doctrine o/Necessity
How do the actions of the governor-general measure up to the test of
legality if the doctrine of necessity is applied? The answer is not easy. For
one, it is not possible to apply precedents in any mechanical way. Each sit-
uation of crisis is different from any other, and the doctrine has to be
applied to the specific circumstances of the situation under study. Second,
it is not possible to apply the rules of the doctrine in any objective or
abstract manner. One has to understand the constraints under which the
person in charge had to act. One may disagree with his judgment, aided
by hindsight, political predilections, or a different assessment of the
exigencies. Decisions sometimes need to be taken quickly in a volatile situ-
ation. Outside observers do not always know the full facts as available to
the person in charge. On the other hand, it would be equally erroneous to
apply an entirely subjective test, for that would amount to no test at all,
precluding any examination of the appropriateness of the acts of, in this
case, the governor-general. The court would be justified in determining
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what a reasonable person in the position of the governor-general, aware
of all the facts that he was aware of, subject to all his constraints, and with
some appreciation of the consequences of his acts, would decide. If the
acts of the governor-general were so out of line with what a reasonable
person would do, the court might well conclude that he was not acting in
good faith and should not have the benefit of the defense of the doctrine of
necessity.
There is a further difficulty in this case. The courts have generally
assessed the acts, allegedly based on the doctrine of necessity, of those
who have assumed effective authority and are in a sense responsible for
their actions. Although on several occasions the governor-general claimed
that he was in command and that he ran a civilian administration, it
seemed to many observers that effective powers lay with Rabuka and his
associates. A dramatic illustration of this is the total disregard by Rabuka
of the Deuba agreement that the governor-general had so painstakingly
put together. The governor-general had not initiated the action that led to
the May coup (for the purpose of this analysis I disregard rumors that he
was involved with Rabuka; see Lal 1988, 131; and Robie 1987). He had
tried, as he claimed, to stop the coup and ensure respect for the constitu-
tion in circumstances when he did not have full command of forces. It
would therefore not be appropriate to judge him by the same standards as
for example the late President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan.
The governor-general's initial justification for deviating from the con-
stitutional provisions was that his ministers were not available to advise
him, so he had to act at his own discretion. He then envisaged that his
assumption of authority would be temporary, presumably until his minis-
ters were released. He stated his intention to restore constitutional rule
and regard the constitution as still in force. All public officers should
remain on duty; as commander in chief, he ordered the army and the
police to "return to their lawful allegiance in accordance with their oath of
allegiance and their duty of obedience without delay." After some initial
hesitation, he refused to recognize the military regime or swear in Rabu-
ka's council (although he swore in Rabuka). Up to that point (with the
exception of swearing in Rabuka) his conduct may be regarded as correct.
However, there is considerable doubt of the legality-applying the doc-
trine of necessity-of his next major initiative. On 19 May, the same day
as the prime minister and his colleagues were released from military deten-
tion after their lawyer had filed applications for habeas corpus, he dis-
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solved Parliament and dismissed the government, acting at his own discre-
tion. He announced plans to run the administration with the help of a
council of advisers that he would appoint; and gave amnesty to Rabuka
and his collaborators. How is one to square that action with his earlier
statement that he had assumed executive authority temporarily in the
absence of his ministers? His explanation was that "in the situation pres-
ently obtaining in Fiji the Prime Minister and his Ministers are unable to
discharge the powers duties and functions conferred upon them by the
Constitution" (Proclamation NO.3, 19 May 1987). He claimed his action
was necessary because he could not restore the present Parliament and
"must take into account the practical realities of the situation and the
social structure of Fiji."
Thenceforth he appeared largely to ignore Bavadra and his colleagues,
and any attention he paid them seems to have been on the advice of the
Queen in the early days, until the negotiations leading to the Deuba meet-
ings. He relied on the advice of the Great Council of Chiefs, by no means
an impartial body (and whose meeting in May 1987 was unconstitution-
ally convened), and depended heavily on Mara and Rabuka. Most of the
decrees he passed gave increased powers to the armed forces and the
administration, now dominated by these two men. Both the Constitu-
tional Review Committee and the councillors he appointed to advise him
were heavily biased in favor of the Taukei Movement and the Alliance
Party. One may argue on his behalf that he had no option other than to go
along with Rabuka, the taukei, and the Alliance; that on the whole he
exercised a restraining influence on Rabuka; and that his efforts in August
and September 1987 manifested a true desire for reconciliation of oppos-
ing views and a return to constitutional democracy.
How valid are the acts of the governor-general measured against the
four important tests of acts allegedly undertaken under necessity that
emerge from the cases discussed earlier? The first requirement is that an
imperative necessity must arise out of exceptional circumstances not con-
templated in the constitution and requiring immediate action to preserve
some vital functions of the state. There is little doubt that the military
coup satisfied this condition. The second test is that there must be no
other course of action reasonably available. Here the case would depend
on the validity of the claim that the governor-general had no option but to
go along with the views of Rabuka and the Great Council of Chiefs.
Against that view, it could be argued that the governor-general could
I
!
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have tried harder to persuade Rabuka to return the military to the bar-
racks. Rabuka had consistently declared his commitment to the chiefly
system and professed loyalty to his high chief. The governor-general hap-
pened to be his high chief, and firmness on the part of the governor-gen-
eral, coupled with the support of the Coalition ministers and members
and friendly neighboring states, might have turned the tide. There is little
evidence that he considered alternatives. By his premature dissolution of
the Parliament and the dismissal of the government he made other solu-
tions highly unlikely. There can he no justification for the dissolution of
the recently elected Parliament or for the dismissal of the government. He
might in his discretion have chosen not to summon Parliament for the time
being, but its dissolution could in no sense be regarded as necessary in the
circumstances. His dismissal of the government sidetracked the Coalition
leaders and weakened their legal and political position. By these two acts,
he went a long way toward consolidation of the coup, its leaders, and
their objectives.
Furthermore, he authorized a recruiting program that brought the army
to 5500 men, as well as the purchase of additional arms and two fast oil-rig
tenders for use as patrol boats, for which there appeared to be little neces-
sity (indeed very much the contrary). Similarly, there would appear to be
little justification for the amnesty for Rabuka and his collaborators (quite
apart from the fact that he misconceived his powers under the law, since
the exercise of the "prerogative" of mercy is possible only after a convic-
tion), his explanation being that no purpose would be served by vindic-
tiveness, which might hinder the complete restoration of legitimacy. This
early blow against the rule of law by the governor-general may well have
encouraged Rabuka, the taukei, and their collaborators to further acts of
lawlessness, and, as we have seen, amnesties for such acts appear to have
become standard. The governor-general then went on to promote Rabuka
and some of his close associates in their military ranks. The necessity for
this action is questionable, to say the least.
The third test is that the acts must as far as possible be consistent with
the constitution and the rights of citizens under it. I have already noted the
massive deviations from the constitution: the dissolution of the Parlia-
ment, the dismissal of the government, the running of the administration
by the governor-general and his council of ministers, the emergency regu-
lations, the censorship of the media, the grant of amnesty, the disregard of
the lawfully appointed prime minister and his ministerial colleagues.
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These deviations are valid only if absolutely necessary, but the case for so
regarding them is not strong. Ganilau was careful in the very early stages
to respect the broad parameters of the constitution, but he soon appears
to have taken the position that the necessity doctrine enabled him to do
what he felt desirable. There is reason to believe that he took the flexible
stance under pressure from some members of his council. His legal advis-
ers were in fact in disagreement about his legal powers. The solicitor gen-
eral (John Flower) took the view that the powers were restricted to those
strictly necessary in the circumstances to maintain law and order, while a
visiting counsel (supported by the government's new legal adviser, Alipate
Qetaki), advised him that he could personally exercise all the powers
available to the prime minister and his cabinet under the constitution
(PNG Post Courier, 15 Aug 1987). (That advice, as is clear from this analy-
sis, I think was wrong.)
The fourth test is that the acts must not be such that in their intent and
effect they consolidate or strengthen the coup; on the contrary, they must
be directed to a speedy return to constitutional rule. It would be unprofit-
able to enter into a discussion of the intentions of the governor-general-
he stated several times his intention to steer Fiji back to constitutional
rule, while at an early stage he appears to have committed himself to the
aim of the coup, the establishment of Fijian supremacy, which in principle
is incompatible with the 1970 constitution. However, it is possible to be
more confident about the effect of the acts of the governor-general. Here
one is constrained to conclude that they helped to consolidate Rabuka's
authority: not only was he pardoned for his treasonable activities and pro-
moted to commander of the armed forces, but the military was provided
with increased numbers and armaments and extensive powers of arrest
and detention. The very ambiguity of the legalities of the situation pro-
duced by the intervention and claims to authority of the governor-general
helped Rabuka, as I have already argued. There is little doubt that he got
what he wanted, and, in the ultimate analysis, he was the person in effec-
tive authority and the main beneficiary of the actions of the governor-gen-
eral.
No attempt was made to restore the 1970 constitution. When the gover-
nor-general talked of a return to parliamentary government, he had in
mind a new constitutional dispensation more in line with the thinking of
Rabuka and his taukei associates. The initial terms of reference he pro-
posed for the Constitutional Review Committee were to suggest amend-
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ments to the 1970 constitution that "will guarantee indigenous political
rights" (generally understood to mean their political supremacy). He told
the Great Council of Chiefs that "as a native Fijian and as one who is
blessed with chiefly status, the interests of the indigenous Fijians, are
those which I hold and shall always hold dear and close to my heart," and
assured them that no administrative arrangements he made would ignore
or be capable of undermining the interests of native Fijians (Scarr 1988,
87-88). Under this fourth test it would appear that the acts of the gover-
nor-general were not legal.
Notwithstanding my analysis, massive deviations from the constitution
and the assumption of extensive powers by the governor-general might
have been justified if this had been the only way to prevent the infliction of
greater harm to the country. About the time he dissolved Parliament,
Ganilau thought that public disorder might ensue if he resigned (Scarr
1988,84), but public disorder did occur while he remained theoretically in
charge. There was a steady attrition of human rights, harassment of the
members of the coalition, discriminatory enforcement of the law, and
decline in the economy. His conduct was far from that of an impartial
ruler holding the balance fairly between the opposing groups and search-
ing for a genuine compromise. Sadly, it must be concluded that his acts
were indefensible under general constitutional principles. His presidency
under Rabuka's republic may be said to have merely formalized the posi-
tion he held from the time of the first coup. That he should agree to serve
under what is essentially a military and racist regime (which he was alleg-
edly trying to eliminate) must cast doubts about his commitment to a fair
and constitutional democracy.
CONCLUSION
The illegality of the conduct of the governor-general does not mean that
all acts of the regime would be denied legal effect by the courts. In the
Rhodesian cases arising out of the Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the courts accepted that in certain circumstances they enforce cer-
tain laws not because of the authority of the lawmaker, but in spite of it in
order to maintain the social order. Only a limited number of laws would
qualify under this criterion, for example, budgetary appropriations to run
schools and hospitals and to provide other essential services. It is not nec-
essary to examine the specific decrees and proclamations of the Fiji regime
GHAI • A COUP BY ANOTHER NAME? 33
that the courts would have been justified in enforcing, for the concern of
this paper is the exploration of broad constitutional principles.
Nor do I pretend that a resolution of the legal issues of the powers of
the head of state is dispositive of political issues and power. Having filed a
suit to challenge the legality of the dissolution of Parliament and the dis-
missal of the government by the governor-general, the Coalition leader-
ship was in no hurry to pursue it. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
they were apprehensive of the consequences of a victory for their legal
argument (Scarr 1988, 105-106). Their anxieties arose from a number of
sources. First, many Fijians had been upset at the affront to their high
chief (not, be it noted, to him as governor-general) by the institution of the
case. A decision by the court that he had acted unconstitutionally would
further inflame feelings and erode Fijian support for the Coalition. Sec-
ond, the governor-general would probably resign, which in the Coalition's
view could produce greater chaos and strengthen the hand of the more
extreme among the taukei. Despite its reservations about his intentions
and acts, the Coalition still regarded the governor-general as the only
party likely to achieve a satisfactory settlement and did not therefore want
to weaken his position. Third, the Coalition leader must have realized
that there would be no real prospect of enforcing a favorable court judg-
ment, which might well precipitate a declaration of a republic.
On the other hand, the impendence of the case could be useful. The
regime claimed to be legal and from that claim gained valuable advan-
tages, including a preferred position with the Queen for the governor-gen-
eral. But the case implied that the claim was by no means justified beyond
doubt (and the ruling of the court in August 1987, dismissing the request
on behalf of the governor-general to strike out the action as frivolous and
of no merit, that the case was of great importance, strengthened doubts
about the legality of the govenor-general's conduct). The Palace was
thought to be concerned about the case; so it might bring pressure to bear
on the governor-general, who himself might take care to operate within
the broad framework of the constitution. The governor-general (as well as
the Alliance Party) was known to be anxious about the outcome, and thus
perhaps susceptible to a political compromise on promise of the with-
drawal of the case.
Furthermore, the Coalition had been unsuccessful in pursuing other
avenues of protest and a hearing, and it had been largely ignored by the
governor-general. The judiciary, on the other hand, had taken a sympa-
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thetic position, and the courts were the only public forum where the Coa-
lition could air its grievances. But the case was an asset that could be more
readily cashed by its withdrawal than its prosecution through the courts.
This irony typifies the paradoxes and ambiguities of legality in situations
of civil turmoil and unlawful seizures of power. While it is quite right to
establish the parameters of the exceptional powers of the head of state, as
an end toward clarity and the promotion of constitutional rule, it is clear
that legal considerations are merely one, and generally a secondary, aspect
of decision making when power struggles follow grave threats to or viola-
tions of the constitution.
Notes
I The chronology of the coup is derived from published accounts, government
sources, and personal observation-which explains why I have not provided
detailed documentation. That is available in Lal (1988) and Scarr (1988). [And
other books listed in this issue: see Resources; Book Reviews.-Ed.]
2 Rabuka is reported to have said in May 1987 that "I am still in control but I
need the Governor-General for the international community, our relationship
with the outside world and with the Queen" (Guardian. 22 May 1987).
3 In fact a Proclamation was issued granting amnesty to Rabuka (Proclama-
tion no. 4, 23 May 1987, in Fiji Royal GazeUe vol 114, no. 40).
4 It appears that Fiji has a PUbli~ Safety Act under which the governor-general
can make regulations to maintain order in times of civil commotion. But this is an
old colonial piece of legislation, which therefore had to be read with changes nec-
essary to make it compatible with the 1970 constitution with its protection of fun-
damental rights (Fiji Independence Order 1970, para 5[1]); in any case the gover-
nor-general may have considered that it did not provide sufficient authority for all
the regulations he deemed necessary.
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